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Capital Inflows into Latin America: A Stop-Go Story? 
1.1.1  Introduction 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the vast majority of the Latin Ameri- 
can countries embarked on ambitious reforms aimed  at modernizing their 
economies. Country after country turned away from decades of protectionism 
and government controls and began to experiment with market-oriented poli- 
cies. Colombia provides a vivid illustration of this regional trend. During the 
early months of  1990 candidate CCsar Gaviria promised that, if elected presi- 
dent, he would launch a major transformation of Colombia’s economic system. 
In every speech he argued that the development path followed by Colombia 
since the 1940s had become obsolete and that, in order to achieve rapid growth 
and improve social conditions for the majority of the population, significant 
reforms had to be undertaken; he called for a major shake-up of the Colombian 
economy. On 7 August 1990 C6sar Gaviria was inaugurated as Colombia’s con- 
stitutional president. During the next four years a set of  policies aimed at dras- 
tically changing the nature of  Colombia’s economic structure were put into 
effect: exchange controls were abolished; imports were liberalized; labor legis- 
lation was reformed; controls over direct foreign investment were relaxed; the 
financial sector was deregulated; legislation governing port  operations was 
modified; the insurance industry was liberalized; and the tax system was mod- 
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ernized. This phenomenon was not unique to Colombia, however. Close to 
Colombia, the administrations of Presidents Fujimori in Peru, Perez in Venezu- 
ela, and Sanchez de Losada in Bolivia also embarked on major reform efforts. 
In other countries a similar trend was followed: Presidents Menem in Argen- 
tina, Cardoso in Brazil, and Arzu in Guatemala, among others, also launched 
important modernization programs during the 1990s. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that during the first half of this decade most countries in Latin America 
followed the steps of the two early reformers: Chile and Mexico.’ 
And when the world was  about to believe that Latin America had finally 
changed, the Mexican currency crisis erupted in December 1994. This turn of 
events generated considerable anxiety among policy analysts, financial opera- 
tors, and international civil servants. Some asked whether Latin America was 
indeed ready to adopt market-oriented policies, while others questioned the 
appropriateness of  specific policies, including the use of  a rigid nominal ex- 
change rate as a way  to reduce inflation. The role played by  large capital in- 
flows-which  at their peak surpassed 9 percent of Mexico’s GDP-has  been 
at the center of almost every postmortem of the Mexican crisis. Some analysts 
have argued that these massive flows allowed Mexico to increase consumption 
in spite of weak fundamentals.  According to others, the predominantly “specu- 
lative” nature of  these flows signaled, from early on, that the Mexican expe- 
rience was bound to run into a serious external crisis. Yet  others argued that 
Mexico’s mistake was to have lifted capital controls too early, allowing these 
speculative flows to disturb the country’s macroeconomic foundations. Ac- 
cording to these analysts a more appropriate policy stance in Mexico would have 
been to maintain some form of capital controls, as a number of emerging econ- 
omies-including  Chile, Colombia, and Israel-have  done for some time. The 
proponents of  this view argue that capital controls isolate these young econ- 
omies from volatile short-run capital flows, helping them to reduce their overall 
degree of vulnerability to external shocks, including speculative attacks.2 
In the early 1990s it became fashionable to compare Latin America’s some- 
what traumatic experience with capital inflows with East Asia’s  supposedly 
successful capital flow management. The recent currency crises in a number 
of East Asian countries-including  Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indo- 
nesia, and South Korea-have  raised, once again, analysts’ interest in issues 
related to the management of capital flows. Questions related to capital account 
sustainability and the feasibility of fixed nominal exchange rates in a world of 
capital mobility, among others, have moved to the fore of policy discussions. 
It may be tempting to argue that Latin America and East Asia are not so differ- 
ent after all. Perhaps it was a matter of timing, with the Mexican crisis leading 
the way to the more recent developments in East Asia. Moreover, the volatility 
1. On the Latin American reforms see, e.g., Edwards (1995b). 
2. On the Mexican crisis see, e.g., Dornbusch and Werner (1994), Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and 
Valdes (1995), Bruno (1995), and Calvo and Mendoza (1996). On the benefits and costs of capital 
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experienced by financial markets during the fall of 1997 has raised the question 
of “contagion.” Analysts have wondered whether in an era of capital mobility 
rumors and changes in expectations in a particular country can spread to other 
nations with healthy fundamentals. 
This paper deals with Latin America’s experience with capital flows during 
the past decade and a half. It concentrates on a number of issues of increasing 
interest among academics and international observers, including the effect of 
capital inflows on domestic savings, the effect of capital mobility on the ability 
to engage in independent monetary policy, and the effectiveness of capital con- 
trols. Latin America’s experience with capital mobility should be illuminating 
to scholars interested in other regions of the world. Indeed, as will be seen in 
this paper, during the past few years the Latin American countries have been a 
laboratory of sorts, where almost every possible approach to capital mobility 
has been tried. The paper is organized as follows: section 1.1.1 is the introduc- 
tion and provides the motivation. Section 1.1.2 reviews the behavior of capital 
flows to Latin America during the past twenty years. It is shown that during 
this period the region has gone through wild cycles. In the mid- to late 1970s 
the countries of Latin America were on the receiving end of petrodollar recy- 
cling and were flooded with private capital. All of this came to an end with the 
eruption of the Mexican debt crisis in 1982. During the next eight years the 
international capital market dried up for every country in the region, and net 
private capital inflows became significantly negative. Things changed in 1991, 
when once again private capital began to pour into the region. In this section I 
also discuss the most important causes of the surge of  capital flows into the 
area experienced during 1996-97. 
In section 1.1.3 I discuss the extent to which capital mobility has been truly 
restricted in Latin America. I argue that in most developing countries there are 
significant differences between the degrees of  legal capital mobility and of 
“true” capital mobility, and I provide some estimates of the latter. Section 1.1.4 
concentrates on the effects of capital mobility on real exchange rates and inter- 
national competitiveness. In this section I also address the important question 
of  capital flow  sustainability and the dynamics of  adjustment, and I briefly 
discuss issues related to the sequencing of economic reform. Section 1.1.5 con- 
centrates on the effectiveness of monetary policy when there is (some) capital 
mobility. In particular, I discuss Latin America’s experiences with policies 
aimed at sterilizing capital flows. In this section I also address the role of capi- 
tal controls as a device for isolating emerging economies from the volatility of 
international capital markets. I review the experiences of Chile and Colombia, 
and I argue that, by  and large, the effectiveness of capital controls has been 
limited in these two countries. In section 1.1.6 I deal with the role of the bank- 
ing sector in intermediating capital flows in Latin American countries. Finally, 
in section 1.1.7 I present some concluding remarks. 
It is important to stress at the outset that Latin America is an extremely 
diverse region with sophisticated as well as backward economies, with large 8  Sebastian Edwards 
and very small countries, with stable and volatile economic systems. This vari- 
ation means that broad generalizations are bound to be misleading and to pro- 
vide oversimplified views of the region. For this reason, then, in this paper I 
make an effort to make distinctions among countries, as  well as to discuss 
broad regional trends. 
1.1.2  Capital Flows to Latin America: 
Historical Background and Recent Trends 
From Petrodollar Recycling to the Mexican Debt Crisis of  1982 
During the 1960s and early 1970s Latin America was basically cut off from 
private international financial markets. With the exception of limited amounts 
of  direct foreign investment (DFI), very little private capital moved  into the 
region. During most of  this period Latin America relied on official capital 
flows-largely  from the World Bank, the Inter American Development Bank 
(TDB), and the International Monetary Fund (JMF). In a way the region was a 
captive customer of  the multilateral institutions. In the mid- and late 1970s, 
however, things began to change as international private liquidity increased 
significantly, and Latin America became a major recipient of recycled “petro- 
dollars.” In 1981 alone the region received (net) private capital inflows in ex- 
cess of 21 percent of exports. Individual country cases, however, differed signif- 
icantly during this period. While in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela a majority 
of these flows were captured by the government and were used to finance large 
(and increasing) fiscal deficits, in Argentina and Chile-two  nations embarked 
at the time on early market-oriented reforms-they  were largely channeled to 
the private ~ector.~ 
By 1981  casual observers of the Latin American scene were surprised by how 
smoothly things were going. In spite of major commodity price shocks, most 
countries in the region continued to grow at healthy if not spectacular rates, and 
a handful in the Southern Cone were even experimenting with market-oriented 
reforms. What most observers missed at the time-as  they would again a dozen 
years later in Mexico-were  four worrisome developments: (I) real exchange 
rates had appreciated significantly, seriously hurting export competitiveness; 
(2) domestic saving remained flat, at rates inconsistent with sustainable rapid 
growth; (3) a large proportion of the capital inflows were being used to finance 
consumption or investment projects of doubtful quality; and (4) most capital 
inflows were intermediated by banks that were subject to little supervision, and 
that lack of oversight quickly became the Achilles’ heel of these economie~.~ 
3. On the behavior of the Latin American economies during this period see, e.g., Dombusch 
(1988) and Edwards (1988b). 
4.  Naturally, since funds are fungible it is very difficult to how  exactly how the capital inflows 
were finally used. The above description, however, gives an accurate picture of the economic de- 
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And to make things even worse, during that period productivity growth was 
extremely low in most of the region. 
In August 1982 Mexico informed a stunned international community that it 
was not able to meet its financial obligations and that it was seeking IMF sup- 
port and the postponement of its debt payments. The financial community re- 
acted badly to this news, and with traditional herd instinct decided to pull out 
of Latin America as a region. In late 1982 and early 1983, country after country 
saw its access to international financial capital markets disappear. Even Chile 
and Colombia, two countries that obeyed the rules of  the game and did not 
attempt to  reschedule their debts, experienced a drying-up of  private inter- 
national financing. They were subject to what Ocampo (1989) has called the 
Latin “neighborhood effect.” 
From Muddling Through to the Brady Plan 
Between  1982 and  1989 most  of  the  Latin American nations muddled 
through, while they tried to negotiate debt reduction deals with their private 
creditors. The initial reaction by the creditor countries was that the debt crisis 
represented a temporary liquidity problem that could be solved with a com- 
bination  of  macroeconomic adjustment, debt-rescheduling agreements, and 
some structural reforms. This approach was pushed by  the U.S. government 
and, in practice, was coordinated by the IMF and the World Bank. The official 
approach called for “new monies” (up to US$20 billion) to be lent to those 
countries that indeed engaged in structural reforms. Not surprisingly, the bank- 
ing community endorsed this view, although it argued for shifting the burden of 
new financing to multilateral and official institutions: “Realism demands an in- 
creased share of new money to be furnished by official sources during the next 
several years” (Morgan Guaranty 1987, 2). Debt-restructuring operations- 
IMF-sponsored programs and World Bank structural adjustment loans-were 
the most important elements of the early official strategy. 
The 1984  issues of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and the World Bank‘s 
World Development Report included optimistic projections, predicting a steady 
decline of the debt-export ratio in the Latin American countries until  1990. 
Things, however, did not work as expected, and in the following years a grow- 
ing number of  analysts came to recognize that the magnitude of  the prob- 
lem had been seriously underestimated. By 1987 it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the debt burden had greatly reduced the incentives for reforming the 
region’s economies and was seriously affecting the ability of the debtor nations 
to grow. Between 1985 and 1987 net resource transfers-defined  as net capital 
inflows minus interest and dividend payments to the rest of the world-were 
significantly negative, averaging almost 28 percent of exports. 
In March 1989 a fundamental breakthrough in the official approach toward 
the debt crisis took place, when the creditor nations and the multilateral insti- 
tutions recognized that, in many cases, it was in everyone’s interest to provide 
(some) debt forgiveness. The basic idea was that, for countries facing a very 10  Sebastian Edwards 
high implicit marginal tax on foreign exchange earnings, partial forgiveness of 
the debt would be equivalent to lowering the implicit tax and thus would en- 
courage the type of market-oriented reform conducive to higher exports and 
faster growth. In March of that year U.S. secretary of  the treasury Nicholas 
Brady announced a new initiative based on voluntary debt reduction. This ba- 
sic proposal amounted to exchanging old debt for new long-term debt, with a 
lower face value. The exact conversion ratios, and the detailed characteristics 
of the new instruments, were to be negotiated between the debtor countries 
and their creditors. In order to make this new approach feasible and attractive 
to creditor banks, the advanced nations and the multilateral institutions devoted 
substantial resources-on  the order of US$30 billion-to  guarantee the new 
“Brady” concessional bonds. Typically, principal payments on these new secu- 
rities were backed by thirty-year zero-coupon U.S.  Treasury bills, and interest 
payments were subject to rolling three-year guarantees. 
Starting in 1989, then, the official approach toward the crisis combined two 
basic mechanisms for alleviating the debt burden. First, the use of debt reduc- 
tion schemes based on secondary market operations was actively encouraged. 
Although this technique for reducing the debt had been used since the mid- 
1980s, it acquired special momentum after 1988, when, in a number of coun- 
tries, debt-equity swaps became an important mode for privatizing state-owned 
enterprises. Second, direct debt reduction agreements between creditors (com- 
mercial banks) and individual countries became increasingly common after the 
introduction of the Brady plan. Between 1989 and 1997 Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru reached agreements with their 
creditors to reduce their debt burdens. 
In order for countries to be eligible for Brady plan negotiations they had 
to show willingness  “plus some prior  action” to engage in serious market- 
oriented economic reform. From an incentive point of view this new initiative 
was intended to have two effects. First, it was seen as a way  of  rewarding 
countries truly committed to implementing modernization reforms, and sec- 
ond, it was expected that in some countries it would lift the debt overhang 
burdens associated with extremely high payments. In 1989 Mexico and Costa 
Rica were the first countries that, within the Brady plan framework, reached 
broad agreements with their creditors to reduce the value of their debts. Ven- 
ezuela and Uruguay followed in  1990 and  1991, and Argentina and Brazil 
signed draft agreements in 1992. In 1996 Peru became the latest country to 
come to terms with its creditors within the context of the Brady plan. Table 1.1 
contains the details of selected Brady deals. 
By 1990 the vast majority of the countries in the region had embarked on 
market-oriented reforms. Although programs varied across countries, they ex- 
hibited  three  common components:  (1) Stabilization programs  were imple- 
mented aimed at reducing inflation and generating a sustainable current ac- 
count balance.  In  most  countries fiscal retrenchment,  including  major  tax 
reform, was at the heart of these programs.  (2) Economies were opened to Table 1.1  Brady Debt Reduction Agreements in Selected Latin American Countries (millions of US.  dollars) 
Country and Date  Face Value of  Discounted  Total Debt, 
of Agreement  Eligible Debt  Buyback"  Bondsa  Par Bondsb  New Moneyb  December 1991" 
Argentina, 1993  23,160d  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0  56,273 
Brazil, 1993  44,000'  0  n.a.  n.a.g  n.a.g  118,148 
Mexico, 1989  48,089  0  2035  1  22,427  4,387  98,263 
Venezuela, 1990  19,098  1,411  1,794  10,333  6,060  34,08 1 
(35)  (35)  (4-6)' 
(35) 
(35)  (6.25)  (LIBOR + 13/16) 
(55)  (30)  (6.75)  (LIBOR + 7/8) 
Source: World Bank, several country-specific reports. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
"Numbers in parentheses are percentage discounts. 
bNumbers in parentheses are interest rates. 
cIncludes IMF and net short-term debt. 
dEstimated. In addition, there are $8.6 billion in arrears, including imputed interest. 
"Interest rate increases from 4 percent in the first year to 6 percent in the seventh year; 6 percent from then on. 
'Estimated. In addition, there are $6 billion in arrears, including imputed interest 
gSeveral par bonds are offered, with different maturities/grace periods, interest rates, and collateral: Option A, 30/30 years, rate is 4 to 6 percent in the first seven 
years, 6 percent from then on, full collateral principal, twelve-month interest. Option B, 15/9 years, rate is 4 to 5 percent in the first six years, LIBOR + 13/16 from 
then on, twelve-month interest collateral for six years. Option C, 20/10 years, LIBOR + 13/16, but interest above the rate in bond B is capitalized, no collateral. 
Option D, 20/10 years, 8 percent and interest above the rate in bond B is capitalized, no collateral. Option E, 18/10 years, LIBOR + 7/8, no collateral; under option 
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Total capital inflows to Latin America, 1975-96  (billions of 
international competition. While every country reduced its trade barriers sub- 
stantially, the approaches to capital account liberalization were very diverse. In 
some nations, Mexico and Argentina for example, capital controls were abol- 
ished; in others, such as Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, some forms of capital 
controls were maintained. (3) Major privatization and deregulation programs 
were undertaken aimed at reducing the importance of  the state in economic 
affairs. As the reforms proceeded, many countries added the implementation 
of social programs benefiting the poor as a fourth component of the new devel- 
opment strategy (Edwards 1995b). 
The Resumption of Private Flows: Magnitudes and Some Issues 
Starting in  1991 the majority of  the Latin American countries were able, 
once again, to attract private capital. By 1992 the net volume of funds had be- 
come so large-exceeding  35 percent of the region’s exports-that  a number 
of analysts began to talk about Latin America’s “capital inflow problem” (Calvo, 
Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993; Edwards 1993). To many analysts this sudden 
change from capital scarcity and negative resource transfers to foreign capital 
overabundance was surprising and reflected a surge in speculation in interna- 
tional markets. To others the fact that merely a dozen years after a major crisis 
these countries were able to tap the international market reflected the success 
of the market-oriented reforms. If the market is willing to reward these coun- 
tries with plentiful funds, the argument went, it must mean that the reforms are 
bearing fruit. 
Figure 1.1 presents the evolution of  net total capital flows  (in billions of 
dollars) to Latin America during the period 1975-96. Figure 1.2 presents data 
on net resource transfers as a percentage of  exports for the same period. Fi- 
nally, figure 1.3 presents the evolution of net official capital inflows as a per- 
centage of  exports during  1980-96.  Several interesting aspects of  the Latin 
American experience emerge from these figures. First, the cyclical-almost 
paranoid, one could say-nature  of capital inflows to Latin America comes out 
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Fig. 1.3  Net official capital inflows as percentage of exports, 1980-96 
following collapse in inflows during most of  the 1980s, and the remarkable 
return to abundance in recent years. Figure 1.2 shows the severity of the crunch 
in the 1980s, when the region as a whole was transferring (in net terms) almost 
30 percent of  its exports to the rest of  the world. And the data in figure 1.3 
show a new reality in the 1990s, when official capital flows-and  in particular 
funds coming from such multilateral institutions as the IMF and the World 
Bank-have  declined significantly in relative terms. Notice, however, that this 
figure shows a large jump in net official flows in 1995, when in response to the 
Mexican crisis, the IMF, the World bank, the IDB, and the U.S. government 
transferred large amounts of funds to Mexico. This picture is a vivid reflection 
of  the significant change in the role of  official financing during the past few 
years. It has gone from being the most important provider-and  in some coun- 
tries the sole provider-of  foreign funds to being a provider of  stabilizing 
funds. The multilateral official institutions have become insurance companies 
of sorts, whose main role is providing relief when a disaster occurs. 
Figure 1.4 presents data on net capital inflows for eight selected countries. 
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Fig. 1.4  Total net capital flows to selected Latin American countries, 1975-96 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 
American  countries for  1975-96.  Three types  of  flows  are distinguished: 
(I)  DFZ-these  flows reflect, at least in principle, a long-term commitment on 
the part of the investor in the host country. (2) Porgolio investment-this  cat- 
egory includes transactions in equity and debt securities. (3) Other types of 
jows-this  rather broad category includes trade credit (both long and short 
term) and official (bilateral and multilateral) loans. Several important trends 
emerge from these figures. First, portfolio investment is a relatively new phe- 
nomenon in these countries. Until the late 1980s “other” constituted the domi- 
nant form of  inflow to most countries. Second, in some countries portfolio 
flows were by far the dominant form of inflow after 199  1. This has been partic- 
ularly the case in Argentina and Mexico. Figure 1.5  also shows that Brazil has 
experienced a tremendous surge in portfolio funds in the past few years. These 
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Fig. 1.4  (cont.) 
of American Depository Receipts (ADRs)-by  foreign investors and bond is- 
sues in international markets. The World Bank (1997) has reported that an 
increasing number of  institutional investors (including pension funds) in the 
advanced countries are adding emerging economy equities to their portfolios. 
This heavy reliance on equities and bonds contrasts with the 1970s, when syn- 
dicated bank loans constituted the dominant form of private capital inflow to 
Latin America. Third, figure  1.5 shows that  the importance of  DFI varies 
greatly across countries. Chile, Colombia, and Peru have received particularly 
large volumes of  DFI in the past few years. In all three cases these funds have 
been largely devoted to natural-resource-intensive sectors-mining  in Chile 
and Peru and oil in Colombia. 
The recent surge in capital inflows-and  particularly in portfolio inflows- 
to Latin America has been the result of two basic forces: First, developments 
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est rates since 1990-91,  have encouraged investors in the advanced countries 
to seek higher returns in other markets, including Latin America. Calvo et al. 
(1993) provided an early, and very influential, study of the determinants of 
capital inflows to the region. These authors argue that cyclical external factors 
have been by far the most important determinants of these flows. These results 
have recently been confirmed by  the World Bank’s  (1997) massive study of 
private capital inflows to developing countries. Second, the improvement in 
Latin America’s economic prospects-including  the reduction in country risk 
that  has  been  associated  with  the  implementation  of  market-oriented  re- 
forms-has  increased the attractiveness of these countries to international in- 
vestors. In an extension of  the Calvo et al. (1993) study, Chuhan, Claessens, 19  Capital Flows to Latin America 
and Mamingi (1993) found that the recipient country’s own fundamentals were 
as important as cyclical factors in explaining the surge in portfolio flows to 
Latin America. In a recent analysis of  the determinants of  capital inflows to 
Chile, Larrain, Laban, and Chumacero (1997) argued that, while interest rate 
differentials play a key role in determining short-term flows, they are unim- 
portant in determining longer term ones. Long-term flows to Chile are affected 
by longer term structural variables, and in particular by the country’s impres- 
sive market-oriented reforms. 
The prominent role played by  external cyclical factors suggests that, once 
external conditions change, there may be massive flow reversals. Although it is 
too early to know whether this will indeed be the case, some evidence already 
indicates that flow volatility has declined somewhat. First, quarterly inflows to 
the large countries are far less variable than in the past. For example, for the 
1980s the coefficients of variation of quarterly aggregate net inflows to Argen- 
tina, Brazil, and Mexico were 5.4,3.1, and 9.3, respectively. For 1990-97  these 
coefficients had declined in all three countries, to 2.1,2.6, and 1.3. Second, it 
seems that the extent of cross-market contagion has declined significantly.  This 
was apparent in the aftermath of the Mexican and Brazilian currency crises of 
1994 and 1999, when in stark contrast with previous episodes-including  the 
debt crisis of  1982-the  international financial community did not stampede 
out of  Latin America. In fact, this time around, international investors were 
quick to realize that there are significant differences among Latin American 
countries, and after a brief hesitation, they even increased their exposure in 
those countries with strong fundamentals. Both of these developments suggest, 
then, that in spite of the importance of  cyclical elements in determining the 
direction of  capital  flows,  countries with  strong  fundamentals-including 
modern bank supervisory systems-will  not face imminent collapse once in- 
ternational financial conditions change. 
In recent years a number of analysts have become concerned about the very 
low level of  saving in the region: on average, Latin America saves 19 percent 
of GDP, compared with 32 percent in East Asia (see Edwards 1996). This con- 
cern has grown after the Mexican peso crisis of  1994. The surge in capital 
inflows experienced by Mexico in 1991-94  allowed Mexican nationals to in- 
crease their expenditure greatly. Starting in 1990, the country experienced a 
consumption boom that put additional pressure on an already appreciated real 
exchange rate and contributed to the creation of a large current account deficit. 
This rapid increase in consumption had as a counterpart a steep decline in 
domestic saving, from almost 20 percent of GDP in 1988 to 16 percent of GDP 
in  1993. In the 1993 Trends in Developing Economies, the World Bank staff 
already expressed its apprehension in vivid terms and  stated that  “in 1992 
about two-thirds of the widening of the current account deficit can be ascribed 
to lower private savings. .  . . If this trend continues, it could renew fears about 
Mexico’s inability to generate enough foreign exchange to service debt or remit 
dividends” (330). After  1993 the decline in saving became more serious, as 20  Sebastian Edwards 
fiscal policy was relaxed somewhat. The extent to which capital inflows-or 
more specifically the accompanying current account deficits-crowd  out do- 
mestic saving has long been a subject of inquiry among authors interested in 
understanding  saving behavior. In a recent study of saving in Latin America 
Edwards (1996) found that an increase in the current account deficit of  1 per- 
cent of GDP is associated with a decline in private saving of only 0.2 percent 
of  GDP.  Interestingly  enough, however, these results  suggest that in Latin 
America higher current account deficits have a somewhat greater crowding- 
out effect on public sector saving. 
1.1.3  The “True” Degree of Capital Mobility in Latin America 
For many years most Latin American countries restricted international capi- 
tal mobility through a variety of means, including taxes, administrative con- 
trols, and outright prohibitions. Legally speaking, then, and as the IMF doc- 
umented  year  after  year,  most  countries in  the  region  had  closed  capital 
accounts. From an economic point of view, however, what matters is not the 
legal degree of  capital restrictions but the actual or “true” degree of capital 
mobility. Ample historical evidence suggests that there have been significant 
discrepancies between the legal and the actual degree of controls. In countries 
with severe impediments to capital mobility-including  countries that have 
banned capital movement-the  private sector has traditionally resorted to over- 
invoicing imports and underinvoicing exports to sidestep legal controls on cap- 
ital flows. The massive volume of capital that fled Latin America in the wake 
of the 1982 debt crisis showed clearly that, when faced with “appropriate” in- 
centives, the public can be extremely creative in finding ways to move capital 
internationally. A number of  authors have resorted  to the term  “semiopen” 
economy to describe a situation in which the existence of taxes, licenses, or 
prior deposits restricts the effective freedom of  capital movement. However, 
the questions of how to measure, from an economic point of  view, the degree 
of capital mobility and the extent to which domestic capital markets are inte- 
grated in the world capital market are still subject to some debate. 
In two early studies Harberger (1978, 1980) argued that the effective degree 
of  integration of capital markets should be measured by  the convergence of 
private rates of  return to capital across countries. He used national accounts 
data for a number of countries-including  eleven Latin American countries- 
to estimate rates of return to private capital and found that these were signifi- 
cantly similar. More important, he found that these private rates of return were 
independent of national capital-labor ratios. Harberger interpreted these find- 
ings as supporting the view that capital markets are significantly more inte- 
grated than a simple analysis of legal restrictions would suggest. Additionally, 
Harberger (1980) argued that remaining (and rather small) divergences in na- 
tional rates of return to private capital are mostly the consequence of country risk 
premiums imposed by the international financial community on particular coun- 21  Capital Flows to Latin America 
tries. These premiums, in turn, are determined by the perceived probability of 
default and depend on a small number of “fundamentals,” including the debt- 
GDP ratio and the international reserve position of the country in question. 
In trying to measure the effective degree of capital mobility, Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) analyzed the behavior of saving and investment in a number of 
countries. They argue that, under perfect capital mobility, changes in saving 
and investment will be uncorrelated in a specific country. That is, in a world 
without capital restrictions an increase in domestic saving will tend to “leave 
the home country,” moving to the rest of the world. Likewise, if international 
capital markets are fully integrated, increases in domestic investment will tend 
to be funded by  the world at large, and not necessarily by  domestic saving. 
Using a data set for sixteen OECD countries Feldstein and Horioka found that 
saving and investment ratios were highly positively correlated and concluded 
that these results  strongly supported the presumption  that long-term capital 
movement was subject to significant impediments. Frankel (1 989) applied the 
Feldstein-Horioka test to a large number of countries during the 1980s, includ- 
ing a number of Latin American nations. His results corroborated those ob- 
tained by the original study, indicating that saving and investment have been 
significantly positively correlated in most countries. 
In a recent comprehensive analysis of the degree of capital mobility Montiel 
(1994) estimated a series of Feldstein-Horioka equations for sixty-two devel- 
oping countries, including fifteen Latin American nations. He argued that the 
estimated regression coefficient for the industrial countries should be used as 
a benchmark for evaluating whether a particular country’s capital account is 
open or not. After analyzing a number of  studies he concluded that a saving 
ratio regression coefficient of 0.6 provides an adequate benchmark: if a country 
regression coefficient exceeds 0.6, it can be classified as having a “closed” 
capital account; if the coefficient is lower than 0.6, the country has a rather 
high degree of capital mobility. Using this procedure he concluded that most 
Latin American nations exhibited a remarkable degree of capital mobility- 
indeed much larger than an analysis of legal restrictions would suggest. Table 
1.2  contains the estimated Feldstein-Horioka b regression coefficients reported 
by Montiel (1994). As may be seen, for a large number of these countries the 
regression coefficient is below the 0.6 cutoff level. 
Although Harberger and Feldstein-Horioka used different methodologies- 
the former looking at prices and the latter at quantities-they  agreed on the 
need to go beyond legal restrictions in assessing the extent of capital mobility. 
In a series of  studies Edwards (1985, 1988b) and Edwards and Khan (1985) 
argued that time series on domestic and international interest rates could be 
used to assess the degree of openness of the capital account (see also Montiel 
1994). Using a general model that yields the closed and open economy cases 
as comer solutions, they estimated the economic degree of capital integration. 
They argued that capital restrictions play two roles: first, they introduce diver- 
gences into interest rate parity conditions, and second, they tend to slow the 22  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 1.2  Feldstein-Horioka  Regressions for Latin American Countries: 
Coefficient of the Saving Ratio, 1970-90 
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“Different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
bDifferent from both zero and one at the 5 percent level. 
‘Different from one at the 5 percent level. 
process of interest rate convergence. The application of this model to a number 
of countries (Brazil, Colombia, and Chile) confirms the result that in general 
the actual degree of capital mobility is greater than the legal restrictions sug- 
gest. Haque and Montiel(l991) and Reisen and Yeches (1991) expanded this 
model to allow the estimation of the degree of capital mobility even in cases 
when there are not enough data on domestic interest rates and when there are 
changes in the degree of capital mobility through time. Their results once again 
indicated that in most Latin American countries “true” capital mobility has 
historically exceeded “legal” capital mobility. 
1.1.4  Capital Mobility, Real Exchange Rates, 
and International Competitiveness 
The new growth strategy embraced by  the Latin American countries since 
the late 1980s is largely based on achieving export-led growth. This requires, 
in  turn, maintaining competitive real exchange rates, that is, real exchange 
rates that do not become overvalued. Starting in 1991-92,  however, a surge in 
capital inflows has allowed the Latin American countries to increase substan- 
tially aggregate expenditure, generating significant pressure toward real ex- 
change rate appreciation and, thus, a loss of international competitiveness.  This 
phenomenon has generated concern among academics, policymakers, and fi- 23  Capital Flows to Latin America 
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Fig. 1.6  Real exchange rate indexes for selected Latin American 
countries, 1970-97 
nancial sector operators. As Calvo et al. (1993) have  pointed out, however, 
real exchange rate appreciation generated by increased capital inflow is not a 
completely new phenomenon in Latin America. In the late 1970s most coun- 
tries in the region, and especially the Southern Cone nations, were flooded 
with foreign resources that led to large real appreciations. The fact that this 
previous episode ended in a debt crisis has added drama to the current concern 
about the possible negative effects of these capital flows. 
Figure 1.6  presents the evolution of bilateral real exchange  rate (RER) indexes 
for a selected group of Latin American countries for the period 1970-1997:1.5 
An increase in the value of such an index represents a real depreciation and thus 
5. These are bilateral indexes relative to the U.S. dollar and have a base of  1990 = 100. In 
their construction the U.S.  producer price index and each individual country consumer price index 
were used. 24  Sebastian Edwards 
an increase in the country’s degree of international competitiveness.  A number 
of characteristics of RER behavior in Latin America emerge from these figures. 
First, RERs have historically been very volatile in Latin America. Comparative 
analyses of  RER behavior have indeed shown that, for long periods of time, 
RER variability has been greater in Latin America than in almost any other 
part of  the world. Second, these figures show that in all eight countries the 
REiR  depreciated drastically after the 1982 debt crisis, only to experience a 
very large appreciation in the 1990s. These downward swings in RERs were 
largely caused, as I will argue later, by the surge of capital inflows in the 1990s. 
Third, these figures show that for most countries in the sample the appreciation 
trend has slowed in the past two or three quarters and, in some countries, it 
even seems to have ended. 
Figure 1.7 shows the relationship between aggregate (net) capital inflows 
and the RER for a selected group of countries.6 As  may be seen, in all the 
countries there is a negative relationship between capital inflows and the RER: 
increases in capital inflows have been associated with RER appreciation, while 
declines in inflows are associated with RER depreciation. I explore this rela- 
tionship further in table 1.3, where I present correlation coefficients between a 
proxy for quarterly capital inflows and the RER index. As  may be seen, in 
every one of the seven largest Latin American countries there is a negative 
relationship between capital inflows and the RER, and in some the coefficient 
of correlation is quite large (in absolute terms). This table also includes results 
from a series of causality tests. These show that in seven out of the eight cases 
it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that capital flows “cause” RERs; in 
three of the seven countries it is not possible to reject two-way causality; and 
in none of the seven cases analyzed is it found that RERs cause capital inflows. 
These results, then, provide some support for the view that the recent surge 
in capital flows has been (partly) responsible for generating the loss in real 
international competitiveness reported above. 
The exact way in which capital inflows translate into RER appreciation de- 
pends on the nature of the nominal exchange rate system. Under a fixed ex- 
change rate regime, the increased availability of foreign resources will result 
in international reserve accumulation at the central bank, monetary expansion, 
and increased inflation. This, in turn, will put pressure on the RER to appre- 
ciate. As is discussed in greater detail in section 1.1.5, many countries have 
tackled this problem by  attempting to sterilize these flows. Under a flexible ex- 
change rate regime, on the other hand, large capital inflows will generate a nom- 
inal-as  well as real-exchange  rate appreciation. 
A number of analysts have argued that the appreciation of the RER follow- 
ing a surge in capital inflows is an equilibrium phenomenon-that  is, one gen- 
6.  These are the countries for which the IMF provides quarterly data on aggregate capital in- 
flows. In order to have a larger sample, in table 1.3 I have used quarterly changes in international 
reserves as a proxy for capital inflows. 25  Capital Flows to Latin America 
erated by fundamentals-and  thus should not be cause for concern. This was, 
for example, the position taken by  the Mexican authorities during 1991-94 
when a number of independent observers argued that the real appreciation of 
the peso was not sustainable and was bound to generate a major currency cri- 
sis.’ The view that an increase in capital flows leads to an appreciation of the 
RER is correct from a simple theoretical perspective. Indeed, in order for the 
transfer of resources implied by higher capital inflows to become effective, a 
real appreciation is required. A limitation of  this interpretation, however, is 
that it fails to recognize that the rate at which capital was flowing into Mexico 
in 1991-93-at  levels exceeding 8 percent of GDP-was  clearly not sustain- 
able in the long run. This means that at some point the magnitude of the flow 
would have to be reduced, requiring a reversal in RER movement. 
Although there are no mechanical rules for determining the volume of capi- 
tal that can be maintained in the long run, there are some helpful guidelines 
that analysts can follow in order to detect departures from capital inflow sus- 
tainability.8  In general, there is an “equilibrium” level of a country’s liabilities 
that foreigners are willing to hold in their portfolios. Naturally, this “equilib- 
rium portfolio share” is not constant and depends, among other variables, on 
interest rate differentials, the perceived degrees of country and exchange risk, 
and the degree of openness of the economy. Moreover, when countries embark 
on (what is perceived to be) a successful reform program, the equilibrium level 
of  the country’s liabilities that is willingly held by  international investors is 
likely to increase because they will be eager to take part in the country’s “take- 
off.” In a recent paper Calvo and Mendoza (1996) argued that in a world with 
costly information it is even possible for very large volumes of capital to move 
across countries on the basis of rumors. They estimated that, in the case of 
Mexico, belief in a change in domestic returns by 0.5 percent could result in 
capital movements of approximately US$14 billion. 
The following simple framework provides a useful way for approaching the 
capital inflow sustainability issue: assume that in equilibrium international in- 
vestors are willing to hold in their portfolios a ratio k*  of the home country’s 
(Mexico’s, say) liabilities relative to its GDP.9 This ratio depends on a number 
of variables, including the country risk premium and interest rate differentials. 
If, for example, the perceived degree of country risk goes down, and the coun- 
try is seen as more stable, k*  will increase. This approach has two important 
implications. The first has to do with the long-run sustainable level of capital 
inflow and, thus, of the current account deficit. This depends on two factors: 
(1) international demand for the country’s securities and (2) the real rate of 
growth of the economy. If, for example, foreign investors are willing to hold 
7. For discussions of Mexico’s  RER appreciation in 1991-94 see, e.g., Dombusch (1993), Dom- 
busch and Werner (1994). and Edwards (1993). On Mexico’s official position regarding these de- 
velopments see, e.g., Bank of Mexico (various years). 
8. On the issue of  current account sustainability see, among others, Reisen (1995). 
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Fig. 1.7  (cont.) 
national securities amounting to 50 percent of the country’s GDP and the rate 
of growth is 4 percent per year, the long-run sustainable deficit is 2 percent of 
GDP. If, however, the demand for the country’s securities is 75 percent of GDP, 
the sustainable current account deficit is 3 percent of GDP. More specifically, 
long-run sustainable capital inflow as a percentage of GDP is given by the fol- 
lowing equation:I0  Cly = g k*, where C is the current account deficit, y is GDP, 
g is the real rate of  growth of the country, and k*  is the ratio to GDP of  the 
country’s liabilities that are willingly held by international investors. According 
to Bank of Mexico data, at their peak foreign holdings of Mexican securities 
reached approximately 50 percent of the country’s GDP. Growth, however, av- 
eraged less than 4 percent during the first four years of the 1990s. These figures 
10. This assumes that no international reserves are being accumulated. 28  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 1.3  Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rates in Selected Latin American 






































Note: Quarterly changes in international reserves were used as a proxy for capital inflows. Granger 
causality tests were performed. The results for Colombia and Venezuela are sensitive to the sample 
considered. If  1985-97  is used, the correlation coefficient is larger (in absolute terms), and in 
the case of Colombia it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that capital inflows “cause” real 
exchange rates. 
indicate that Mexico’s long-run sustainable current account deficit was in the 
neighborhood of 2 to 3 percent of GDP, significantly below the 7 to 8 percent 
levels actually attained during this period. On the other hand, in a country 
such as Chile, with a rate of growth of approximately 7 percent per year, the 
sustainable level of capital inflow is much larger. If, for instance, the steady 
state foreign demand for Chilean liabilities is 65 percent of the country’s GDP, 
the sustainable inflow of capital is almost 6 percent of GDP. 
The second implication of this framework is related to the dynamic effects 
of  capital inflow on the current account and the RER. Transitional issues are 
particularly important when there are large shifts (positive or negative) in inter- 
national portfolio demand for a small country’s liabilities. If, for example, the 
country’s degree of country risk drops, or if the country in question opens to 
the rest of the world, foreigners will increase their demand for the country’s 
securities. In the short run-while  the newly demanded securities are accumu- 
lated-capital  inflow (and the current account deficit) will exceed in the short 
run, that is, it will overshoot, the level predicted by  the preceding long-run 
analysis. Once portfolio equilibrium is regained, however, and investors hold 
in their portfolios the desired amount of  the country’s securities, capital inflow 
(and the capital account balance) will again revert to its long-run equilibrium 
level. In most instances this adjustment process will not be instantaneous. In 
some cases it will even take a few years. Historically, episodes of capital inflow 
surges have been characterized by increases in the demand for the small coun- 
try’s securities on the order of  20 to 30 percent of GDP, and by peak annual 
inflows on the order of 7 to 9 percent of GDP. Table 1.4 contains data on accu- 
mulated and maximum inflows during recent surges in Latin America. 
One of the most important dynamic effects of the transition described above 29  Capital Flows to Latin America 
Table 1.4  Net Private Capital Inflows to Selected Latin American 
Countries, 1990s 
Inflow  Cumulative Inflow  Maximum Annual 
Country  Episode”  at End of Episodeb  Inflowb 
~ 
Argentina  1 99 1-94 
Brazil  1992-95 
Colombia  1992-95 
Chile  1989-95 
Mexico  1989-94 
Peru  1990-95 















Source: World Bank (1997). 
apenod during which the country experienced a significant surge in net private capital inflow. 
bNet long-term international private capital as a percentage of GDP. 
is on the RER. As capital flows in, expenditure increases and the RER appreci- 
ates. Once capital stops flowing in, or even when the rate at which it flows 
slows down, the RER will be “overly” appreciated, and in order to maintain 
equilibrium, a massive adjustment may be required. The dynamics of capital 
inflow and current account adjustment will require, then, that the equilibrium 
RER first appreciate and then depreciate. And whereas during the surge in in- 
flow the RER appreciates without impediment, when the availability of foreign 
capital declines nominal wage and price rigidity will make the required real 
depreciation difficult under a pegged exchange rate.” 
Naturally, the situation is even more serious if, as a result of  external or 
internal developments, the international portfolio demand for the country’s 
securities declines-as  was the case for Mexico after 20 December 1994 and 
for Argentina in the first half of  1995. Under these circumstances, the capital 
account balance suffers a very severe contraction-and  the current account 
may even have to become positive-during  the transitional period toward the 
new  equilibrium. As is well known by  now,  whereas Mexico was  unable to 
maintain the peg under the new circumstances,  Argentina decided to stand firm 
and to engineer a major aggregate demand adjustment that generated a major 
hike in the rate of unemployment. 
The effects of changing capital flows on the equilibrium RER, the current 
account, and reserve accumulation can be  analyzed using simple numerical 
simulations. Edwards, Steiner, and Losada (1996) presented results based on a 
model of a small open economy with tradables and nontradables. In this frame- 
work, an increase in capital inflow allows residents of the country in question 
to increase expenditure on both types of  goods. As a result of  the surge in 
11. This type of  analysis has been made in relation to the sequencing of reform debate. See, 
e.g., Edwards (1984). 30  Sebastian Edwards 
capital inflow the current account deficit rises and the RER appreciates. The 
specific magnitudes of these effects depends on the price and expenditure elas- 
ticities of demand and supply of nontradables. This analysis suggests that, un- 
der plausible values for the relevant parameters, an increase in the international 
demand for a small country’s securities equivalent to 20 percent of the coun- 
try’s GDP generates an inflow of capital that will peak at approximately 8 per- 
cent of  GDP; note that these figures correspond closely to Latin America’s 
historical experience reported in table 1.4. In turn, this inflow of  capital will 
generate (under the assumed elasticities) an RER appreciation of  almost 10 
percent. Perhaps the most important aspect of this analysis is that it clearly 
shows that after capital inflow has peaked and begins to decline to its new 
level, the RER has to depreciate until it achieves its new equilibrium level. In 
a fixed exchange rate regime, this real depreciation can only be achieved by 
means of  reducing domestic inflation to a rate below foreign inflation, or, in 
terms of the framework developed by Edwards et al. (1996), by actually reduc- 
ing the price of nontradable goods. 
The above discussion suggests that the relevant question regarding events in 
Mexico was not, as some analysts incorrectly thought during 1994, whether 
the inflows observed during 1991-93  were sustainable but how and when Mex- 
ico was going to adjust to a lower availability of foreign resources. Mexico’s 
clinging to its rigid exchange rate system made a smooth landing increasingly 
unlikely as the events of  1994 unfolded. 
1.1.5  Capital Mobility and the Effectiveness of 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy 
Most  Latin  American  countries have  tried  to  minimize  the  macroeco- 
nomic-and  in particular, the RER-consequences  of capital inflow surges. 
Basically, three approaches have been used  to deal with this phenomenon: 
(1) Some form of capital controls are imposed in order to slow the rate at which 
foreign funds come into the country. Brazil, Chile, and Colombia have relied 
on these types of controls. (2) Sterilized intervention is attempted in order to 
offset the monetary-and  inflationary-consequences  of  capital inflow. Al- 
most every country in the region has tried this approach. (3) Nominal exchange 
rate flexibility is increased. While, strictly speaking, the adoption of  a more 
flexible exchange rate regime does not avoid the real appreciation, it accommo- 
dates the required real appreciation without a surge in domestic inflation. Chile 
is the only country that has used this mechanism to any serious extent-and 
for a long period of  time. In  addition to these three mechanisms there have 
been discussions in a number of  countries about using fiscal adjustment to 
compensate for the monetary impact of capital inflows on the RER. In no coun- 
try, however, has this discussion actually become implemented into policy. In 
this section I review some of  the Latin American country experiences with 
these policy responses. 31  Capital Flows to Latin America 
Table 1.5 
Type of Capital Inflow  Restriction 
Restrictions on Capital Inflow to Chile 
Direct foreign investment 
Portfolio inflows: issuing of 
Minimum stay of one year. No restrictions on repatriation 
of profits. 
The issuance of ADRs by Chilean companies is strictly 
regulated. Only companies that meet a certain risk 
classification requirement (BBB for nonfinancial 
companies and BBB+ for financial institutions) can 
issue ADRs. There is also a minimum amount 
requirement: until September 1994, this was US$50 
million; at that time it was lowered to $25 million; and 
in November 1995 it was further reduced to $10 
million. 
All other portfolio inflows-including  secondary ADR 
inflows, foreign loans, and bond issues-are  subject 
to a nonremunerated 30% reserve requirement. This 
reserve requirement is independent of the length of 
stay of the inflow. In the case of loan and bonds, the 
recipient may choose to pay the financial cost of the 
reserve requirement. 
subject to the 30% deposit. 
American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) 
Trade credit  Credit lines used to finance trade operations are also 
Source: Budnevich and Lefort (1997). 
Other portfolio inflows 
Capital Controls in Chile and Colombia 
Chile and Colombia have relied on capital controls in an effort to avoid some 
of  the destabilizing short-term effects-in  particular, RER appreciation-of 
capital inflow surges. In their current form capital controls were introduced in 
1991 in Chile and in 1993 in Colombia.’2 
In Chile these restrictions have taken two basic forms: minimum stay re- 
quirements for DFI flows and nonremunerated reserve requirements on other 
forms of capital inflow. Table 1.5 contains details on these regulations, as of 
the third quarter of 1997. In Colombia, on the other hand, capital controls have 
taken the form of  a variable reserve requirement on foreign loans-except 
trade credit-obtained  by the private sector. Initially, this reserve requirement 
was set at a rate of 47 percent and was only applicable to loans with a maturity 
shorter than eighteen months. During 1994, as the economy was flooded with 
capital inflows, the reserve requirements were tightened. In March they were 
extended to all loans with a maturity below three years; in August they were 
extended to loans of five years or less. Moreover, the rate of the reserve require- 
ment became inversely proportional to the maturity  of  the loan: thirty-day 
loans were subject to a stiff 140 percent reserve requirement-which  was vir- 
12. It  should be noted that both of these countries had a long tradition with capital controls 
before the 1990s. See, e.g., Edwards (1988b). 32  Sebastian Edwards 
tually prohibitive-while  five-year loans had to meet a 42.8 percent deposit. 
See figure 1.8 for the actual reserve requirements for various loan maturities. 
In both Chile and Colombia restrictions on capital movements act as an im- 
plicit tax on foreign financing. Recent studies by Cardenas and Barreras (1996) 
and Valdes-F’rieto and Soto (  1996) calculated the tax equivalence of these con- 
trols in order to analyze the effects of these restrictions on capital movements. 
In particular they estimated a number of capital inflow equations to investigate 
whether these mechanisms have succeeded in affecting the rate at which capi- 
tal has flowed into countries. These authors found that aggregate capital in- 
flows have not been sensitive to this tax equivalence factor and concluded that 
these capital restrictions have been ineffective in slowing capital movements. 
In both countries, however, capital controls have resulted in a change in the 
composition of capital inflows, with flows not affected by  these implicit taxes 
growing faster than they would have otherwise (see Budnevich  and Lefort 
1997 and Larrain et al. 1997 for similar results). Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1996) 
persuasively argued that, in the case of Chile, the existence of capital controls 
has actually had an important negative effect on welfare for two reasons. First, 
to the extent that trade credit is subject to reserve requirements, these require- 
ments are also an implicit barrier to free trade, and the economy is subject to 
the traditional welfare consequences of protectionism. Second, by introducing 
a wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates these controls result in a 
misallocation of intertemporal consumption and discourage investment. 
In view of the questionable effectiveness of capital controls, policymakers 
in a number of  countries have considered alternative mechanisms to smooth 
the volume of net capital inflows. Some analysts have argued that the relaxation 
of restrictions on capital outflows from developing countries provides an effec- 
tive  way  of  achieving this  goal (Budnevich and Lefort  1997; World Bank 
1997).  According to this view, if domestic residents can freely move funds out 
of  the country (for portfolio diversification or for other reasons), net inflows 
will be lower, and so will the pressure on money creation, inflation, and the 
RER. Laban and Larrain (1997), however, argued that a relaxation of restric- 
tions on capital outflows may further complicate macroeconomic management. 
This will be the case if investors interpret the new policy as reducing the overall 
cost of investing in the country. This, in turn, will make investment more attrac- 
tive than before and (perhaps paradoxically) will generate an increase in net 
capital inflows to the country. 
Sterilized Intervention: Is It Possible? How Costly Is It? 
Most countries in Latin America have tried to offset (at least partially) the 
monetary impact of the recent capital inflow surge. Several mechanisms have 
been used to this end, including increasing commercial banks’ marginal re- 
serve requirements, transferring public  sector deposits to the central bank, 
which is equivalent to imposing a very high reserve requirement on this type 
of  deposit, and undertaking  sterilized intervention on behalf  of  the central Fig. 1.8  Reserve requirement rate versus certificate maturity in Colombia, 1996 34  Sebastian Edwards 
bank. The last mechanism has been used in almost every country in the region 
and is usually carried out through the sale of central bank securities to the pub- 
lic at large. Figure 1.9 illustrates the extent of sterilization in Argentina, Co- 
lombia, and Mexico. As may be seen, in each of  these countries changes in 
reserves have been associated, in the past few years, with changes in the oppo- 
site direction in domestic credit (during the same quarter). 
A problem with sterilized intervention, however, is that it can be very costly 
for the central bank. This is because interest earnings on international reserves 
are rather low, while the central bank has to pay a relatively high interest rate 
to persuade the public to buy its own securities. Calvo (1 99  l),  for example, ar- 
gued that this cost can become so high that it may end up threatening the sus- 
tainability of the entire reform effort. Moreover, as Frenkel(l995)  pointed out, 
in an economy with capital mobility and predetermined nominal exchange rates 
it is not possible for the monetary authorities to control monetary aggregates 
in the medium to long run. This view has been confirmed by econometric esti- 
mates of the monetary “offset” coefficient for a number of countries (see, e.g., 
the studies in Steiner 1995). 
Colombia’s experience during the early 1990s illustrates very clearly what 
Calvo (1991)  called “the perils of sterilization.” In 1990  newly elected Presi- 
dent Gaviria announced a trade liberalization program aimed at eliminating 
import licensing and greatly reducing import tariffs. At the same time a twenty- 
year-old exchange and capital control mechanism was eliminated. By March 
199  1, however, it was becoming clear that trade reform was not having the ef- 
fects the economic team had anticipated. Perhaps the most surprising fact was 
that imports were not growing and that, as a result of it, the country was expe- 
riencing a growing trade surplus. This, in conjunction with larger inflows of 
capital, was putting pressure on the money supply, making macroeconomic 
management very  difficult. As  inflation increased, the RER  began to  lose 
ground, and both exporters and import-competing sectors began to lose com- 
petitiveness.  The Banco de la Republica reacted to this situation by implement- 
ing a series of policies that in retrospect appear to have contradicted each other. 
First, an aggressive policy of sterilizing reserve accumulation was undertaken. 
This was done by issuing indexed short-term securities (the OMAs). In the first 
ten months of  1991 the stock of this instrument shot up from US$405 million 
to $1.2  billion, or 85  percent of the total monetary base. Naturally, this policy 
resulted in an increase in domestic (peso denominated) interest rates and a 
significant interest rate differential. This attracted further capital into the coun- 
try, frustrating the sterilization policy itself. Second, the authorities decided- 
as they had in the past when facing coffee booms-to  postpone the moneti- 
zation of  export proceeds. For this reason, in  1991 the monetary authority 
stopped buying foreign exchange in the spot market. Instead, it started issuing 
“exchange certificates” (certificados de cambio) in exchange for export foreign 
currency proceeds. These certificates could be transacted in the secondary mar- 
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year. Moreover, the central bank established a maximum discount for the cer- 
tificates  in  the  secondary market  of  12.5 percent. All  of  this,  of  course, 
amounted to an attempt at controlling too many variables-the  spot and future 
exchange rates, the nominal interest rate, and the stock of money-at  inconsis- 
tent levels. During the first ten months of  1991 Colombia was trapped in a vi- 
cious circle: a very rapid process of reserve accumulation generated high infla- 
tion and RER appreciation; but the policies put in place to combat these phe- 
nomena created incentives for capital inflows and further appreciation of the 
RER. These events generated two political problems for the Gaviria adminis- 
tration. First, exporters and import-competing sectors were becoming increas- 
ingly unhappy about the real appreciation of the peso; second, the lack of prog- 
ress against inflation was a black spot in an otherwise quite positive picture. 
Nominal Exchange Rate Flexibility: Chile’s Band Experience 
After a major and protracted macroeconomic crisis, in early  1986 Chile 
adopted a nominal exchange rate system based on a crawling band system. The 
band was originally quite narrow, allowing fluctuations of  22  percent around 
a backward-looking crawling central parity. Through time, however, two inno- 
vations were introduced into the system. First, the band became wider, reach- 
ing ?  12 percent in  1997; second, the central parity was defined relative to a 
three-currency basket. The latter measure was based on the idea that basket 
pegging would add some uncertainty to the system, discouraging (very) short- 
term speculators. Throughout, however, the rate of crawl of the band has been 
backward looking and is determined as the previous month’s rate of domestic 
inflation minus an estimate of international inflation. The adoption of this band 
was an integral part of an economic program aimed at achieving very fast rates 
of growth-mostly  driven by export expansion-while  reducing inflation. 
Figure 1.10 presents the evolution of Chile’s band and actual exchange rate 
since 1989. Four important features emerge from this figure. First, given the 
alterations introduced into the system the Chilean band has been, de facto, 
nonlinear relative to the U.S.  dollar. Second, throughout much of the period 
the actual rate was at the bottom of the band. This has been the direct result of 
very large capital inflows, which created an abundance of foreign exchange. 
From all practical points of view, then, during this period the band acted as an 
effective floor for the nominal exchange rate. There is, in fact, little doubt that 
if  it had not been for the band the nominal value of the peso would have ap- 
preciated significantly during the period. Third, the form of the band has given 
significant flexibility to the system, allowing the economy to accommodate 
external shocks, such as the (short lived) scare following the Mexican crisis of 
1994. And fourth, the band has allowed the peso to remain very stable in nomi- 
nal terms in the last eighteen to twenty-four months, taking away inflationary 
pressure from the system. Some evidence, however, suggests that the widening 
of  the band added uncertainty to the economy and resulted in an increase in 
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Although the Chilean band it has not prevented RER appreciation, it has 
maintained it at a relatively controlled level. In fact, a new World Bank (1997) 
study indicated that the Chilean peso is still slightly undervalued. Moreover, 
the band has allowed the gradual reduction of inflation-in  1997 it will be ap- 
proximately 5 percent. In fact, in spite of having an elaborate indexation sys- 
tem, Chile has been able to reduce the degree of  inflationary inertia signifi- 
cantly. Given the relative success of the Chilean band system, it is surprising 
that more countries have not adopted this type of regime. 
1.1.6  The Role of the Domestic Banking Sector 
The resurgence of capital inflows to Latin America has raised some impor- 
tant questions: Will there be another reversal? Are institutional investors likely 
to behave in a herd fashion, as in the past? How vulnerable are the Latin Ameri- 
can countries to a contagion effect coming out of East Asia or other emerging 
markets? The analysis presented in the preceding  sections suggests that the 
conditions behind capital flows have changed. These appear to be less volatile 
than in the past, and investors are becoming more sophisticated and understand 
that there are significant differences among regions and countries. However, 
the issue of vulnerability remains. What makes the situation particularly difficult 
is that  in many Latin American  countries commercial banks-which  (ulti- 
mately) intermediate capital inflows-continue  to be financially weak, even in 
the aftermath of the Mexican crisis. Moreover, in most nations supervisory sys- 
tems are inefficient and unable to monitor effectively the quality of the portfolio 
and the extent to which banks indeed abide by existing rules and regulations. 
Latin America’s own history justifies the current concern about banks’ vul- 
nerability. As previous episodes in the region have shown, when banks fail the 
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Mexico illustrate this point vividly. Banks were at the center of the Chilean 
crisis of 1982. After intermediating very large volumes of capital inflows dur- 
ing 1978-80,  commercial banks became increasingly vulnerable to negative 
shocks stemming from the international economy. In mid-1981, as interna- 
tional interest rates increased rapidly, asset prices in Chile began to fall and 
the demand for deposits experienced a significant decline. Some firms had 
trouble paying their debts, and in November 1981 two major banks-Banco 
Espaiiol and Banco de Talca-ran  into serious difficulties and had to be bailed 
out by the government. During late 1981 and early 1982 aggregate production 
collapsed, domestic interest rates continued to increase, and the number of 
bankruptcies increased greatly. In the first half of 1982 deposits in the Chilean 
banking system, especially deposits by  foreigners, continued to decline steeply. 
During the first five months of  1982 alone, foreign deposits in commercial 
banks dropped by  75 percent. An  interesting feature of  the Chilean episode 
was that most commercial banks were owned by large conglomerates (the so- 
called grupos), which received major loans from the banks themselves. Many 
times these loans were made sidestepping financial criteria and were guaran- 
teed by  assets with highly inflated prices. In June 1982 the government decided 
to devalue the peso, in the hopes of  alleviating speculative pressure on the 
economy. The devaluation, however, affected negatively the financial condition 
of many firms that had borrowed heavily in dollars. Depositors decided to fly 
from peso-denominated assets, commercial banks continued to accumulate 
bad loans, and the central bank had to inject large amounts of funds into the 
economy. In January  1983 the government concluded that  the cost of  this 
muddling-through strategy was too high and pulled the rug from under some 
of  the major commercial banks. By  mid-1983 a number of  banks had gone 
bankrupt, and Chile’s financial crisis was in full swing. At the end of the road 
the massive bank bailout that followed cost the country (in present value terms) 
in excess of 20 percent of GDP. 
What makes this story fascinating is its parallel to the  1997-98  crises in 
Indonesia and Korea. All the key elements are there-a  rigid exchange rate 
policy, marked overvaluation, a high current account deficit, reckless lending 
by  conglomerate-controlled banks, poor bank supervision, and a major asset 
bubble. In fact, one cannot avoid thinking that, had watchers of East Asia stud- 
ied the Chilean financial crisis of  1982, they would not have been so shocked 
by the turn of events in the countries once called Asian “tigers.” 
Similarly, it is possible to argue that both the magnitude and timing of the 
1994 Mexican crisis were affected by  the behavior of  the banking system. 
Throughout 1994, as international interest rates increased and Mexico was hit 
by  a series of  political shocks, the Mexican authorities made great efforts to 
maintain domestic (peso denominated) interest rates at a relatively low level. 
A two-prong approach was followed: on the one hand, a cap was imposed on 
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ingly large amounts of  dollar-denominated securities-the  so-called Teso- 
bonos. The investment house J. P. Morgan summarized this state of  affairs 
in its 22 July 1994 newsletter: “Half of the 28-day and 91-day Cetes [peso- 
denominated securities] were issued; the central bank would not accept the 
high yields required by the market to auction the full amount.” And on 23 July 
the Economist pointed out that “the central bank has also had to issue plenty 
of  tesobonos-dollar  linked securities that  are popular with  investors that 
worry about currency risk.” This strategy-which  in retrospect has mystified 
so many analysts-partly  addressed the Mexican authorities’ concerns regard- 
ing the financial health of Mexican banks. This concern had begun in late 1992, 
when  a large increase in  past-due loans became evident. In  1990 nonper- 
forming loans were estimated to be only 2 percent of total loans; that ratio in- 
creased to 4.7 percent in 1992, to 7.3 percent in 1993, and to 8.3 percent at the 
end of the first quarter of 1994. With the fourth largest bank-Banca  Cremi- 
in serious trouble, the authorities tried to buy additional time as they worked 
out an emergency plan. By the end of the first semester the state development 
banks had developed a relief program based on some write-offs of commercial 
banks’ past-due interest and government-issued loan guarantees. In the belief 
that the peso was  sustainable and that they had superior information, Mexi- 
can banks engaged in aggressive derivative operations, accumulating sizable 
dollar-denominated off-balance-sheet liabilities (Garber 1996). On 19 Decem- 
ber 1994, however, with the Bank of  Mexico having virtually run out of re- 
serves the Mexican authorities decided to widen the exchange rate band. It was 
too little, too late. In the months to come it became increasingly clear that a 
key element in the stabilization policy would be to contain-or  at least mini- 
mize-the  extent of the banking crisis. 
1.1.7  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has dealt with Latin America’s experience with capital flows dur- 
ing the past decade and a half. It has covered a number of issues of increasing 
interest to academics and international observers, including the effect of capi- 
tal inflows on domestic saving, the effect of  capital mobility on the ability to 
engage in independent monetary policy, and the effectiveness of capital con- 
trols. The data analysis presented in section 1.1.2 shows that the Latin Ameri- 
can countries have gone through wild cycles. In the mid- to late 1970s they 
benefited from the recycling of petrodollars and were flooded with private cap- 
ital. After the eruption of  the Mexican debt crisis in  1982, the international 
capital market dried up for every country in the region, and net private capital 
inflows became significantly negative. Things changed in  1991, when once 
again private capital began to pour into the region. Although this turn of events 
has largely been welcomed, it has also generated some concern among analysts 
and policymakers. In particular there are still questions about the sustainability 40  Sebastian Edwards 
of these flows, as well as about the extent to which the region will be affected 
by the still developing East Asian crisis. In early 1998 the consensus seems to 
be that this time around Latin America has strong fundamentals and is facing 
the crisis from a strong footing. This view is nicely summarized by the follow- 
ing quote from ING Barings: “Latin America is relatively insulated from the 
direct contagion effect of Asia. . . .  The policy response of the Latin authorities 
to the recent turbulence in the emerging world has been impressive and the 
general resilience of Latin America to a more difficult global economic back- 
drop has much to do . . . with an improving microeconomic base” (1998, 7). 
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2. Francisco Gil Diaz 
I would like to speak based on Mexico’s recent experience, by  which I mean 
especially the post-crisis period, and to compare it with the precrisis behavior 
of short-term capital flows. Some hypothesis is needed as to why they were so 
volatile and so large before the crisis, and why they have apparently shown 
such stable behavior after the crisis. 
Mexico’s recent and varied experience with international capital flows may 
throw some light on the interaction between such flows and different exchange 
rate regimes. To do so, it will be profitable to go from the present back to the 
past, by inspecting the behavior of a flow category that has worried policymak- 
ers because of its short-term nature and high volatility, especially given the 
speed and liquidity that characterize today’s  financial markets. The concern 
about short-term foreign capital flows is well founded, because of the some- 
times ravaging effects of their injection and withdrawal on the financial stabil- 
ity and short-term output behavior of many economies. 
To start the analysis with the most recent figures, consider the stock amounts 
invested by  foreign residents in Mexico’s  money market between December 
1995 and 8 October 1997. These quantities correspond to foreign resident pur- 
chases of  government securities or commercial banks’ money market instru- 
ments. The period chosen is significant because prior to December 1995 the 
figures are substantially contaminated by  the liquidation by  Mexico’s federal 
government of  the  outstanding amounts of  Tesobonos, the  now  infamous 
dollar-linked peso securities first issued at the end of  1991. 
At the end of December 1995, the stock amount, not the flow, of these invest- 
ments in Mexican government securities and private financial money market in- 
struments was $3.8 billion. In December 1996, the amount was $3.9 billion, es- 
sentially the same number. And by the end of the first week of October of this 
year, it was $4.3 billion. So over the course of almost two years the increase has 
been a mere $500 million, or nothing. The figure has stayed basically the same. 
The ups and downs of this concept over the twenty-three-month span, as 
well as its change from the beginning to the end of this period, were minimal. 43  Capital Flows to Latin America 
This behavior is remarkable given the large influx of other categories of foreign 
resident capital into Mexico over the same period: during the past two years, 
the country has been the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment 
in the world, second only to China. It has also received large amounts chan- 
neled toward equity purchases, as well as a resumption of foreign bank loans 
and the floating of private liabilities in international money markets. In 1997, 
these flows will have contributed to financing a current account deficit of about 
$7 billion, plus an increase in international reserves in excess of $10 billion. 
That is a flow of  $17+  billion for this year, and yet the increase in short- 
term money entering Mexico was insignificant. Not only has the amount of for- 
eign money channeled to Mexican monetary instruments remained stationary 
over this period, but its term to maturity is considerably longer than the forty- 
eight-hour investments that flowed in large quantities prior to the 1995 crisis. 
The instruments now being purchased by foreign residents tend to have a matu- 
rity of at least three months, with six months to one year being the favorites. 
The shift in the exchange rate regime between the precrisis and postcrisis 
periods may explain the radical change in the nature of foreign capital flows 
into Mexico. The current lack of volatile capital flows may, in turn, hold the 
key to understanding the remarkable stability of  the exchange rate over this 
recent period, as well as the perilous situation into which the Mexican econ- 
omy fell before 1995. The fixed, or quasi-fixed, exchange rate that prevailed at 
the time, without the automatic self-adjusting processes of  a currency board, 
generated diverse pathological market behaviors. 
First, when the exchange rate veered toward the floor of its initially narrow 
peso-dollar band, it attracted large volumes of short-term capital inflows, be- 
cause as long as the exchange rate stuck to its floor, investors would continue 
to obtain the high yields that had attracted them in the first place. But investors 
knew that the higher yields were possibly transitory under such circumstances, 
because the availability of hard currency, despite the implicit promise of con- 
vertibility, had as a limit some percentage of the international reserves of the 
central bank. The interest rate required to bring capital in, given those uncer- 
tainties, had therefore to contain some premium, and the term for which money 
market investors were willing to commit their capital had to be extremely 
short, allowing them to keep one foot inside and the other outside, so to speak. 
Second, the other extreme possibility was for the exchange rate to be at its 
peso-dollar ceiling, sustainable as long as the central bank had sufficient inter- 
national reserves. But when the exchange rate drifted toward the top of the peso- 
dollar band, the incentive for investors was to try to be the first out of the local 
currency, in a situation so desperate that virtually no interest rate could be high 
enough to encourage them to stay. 
An exchange rate system with bands, therefore, appears likely to generate 
two polar possibilities. One is to attract vast foreign inflows invested in ex- 
tremely short-term instruments; the other, to have investors trying to fly away 
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But this is old stuff, of course. That exchange rates tend to veer off to their 
allowable extremes, and that, once there, the system has all the flaws and dan- 
gers of  a fixed exchange rate, was pointed out several decades ago by  Harry 
Johnson. Otherwise, if the exchange rate does not stick to either of  its ex- 
tremes, the system behaves as a floating exchange rate. So why contaminate it 
with bands? Unfortunately, it seems necessary to continue rebottling old wines 
for the consumption of some economists, as well as for policymakers. 
A careful empirical study performed by Trigueros provides some interesting 
statistical results along this line of reasoning. He concluded that foreign direct 
investment, portfolio investment, and foreign currency deposits issued by com- 
mercial banks, as well as the direct credit they obtained, exhibited remarkable 
stability in Mexico after the onset of the crisis. The opposite is true of foreign 
exchange inflows to the Mexican money market prior to the crisis, when in the 
period from 1990 to September 1994 $40 billion in short-term capital poured 
into Mexico. 
The immediate postcrisis period, that is to say  1995, is atypical, because 
during that year the Mexican government decided to stop issuing Tesobonos 
and to liquidate those outstanding. The behavior of  short-term capital from 
December 199.5 up to the present has already been detailed above. 
Another question related to the interplay between economic crisis and inter- 
national capital flows is whether the latter are the outcome of capricious move- 
ments of  fickle investors whose behavior has to be molded through multiple 
equilibria, which  have multiple trajectories and multiple landing strips, or 
whether the flows respond rather to fundamental causes within the economies 
that become subject to attack. 
Historical  evidence  recently  presented  by  Michael  Bordo  and  Anna 
Schwartz, and the contemporaneous experiences of some Asian countries, to- 
gether with the roots of  the Mexican crisis, point to a rational, if  sometimes 
belated, response on the part of  investors. The Mexican crisis and the recent 
problems in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia bear some striking similarities. 
Credit growth in the private sector was astronomical in Mexico prior to the 
crisis, 2.5  percent per year in real terms for six years. The quality of the expen- 
ditures financed was poor or nonexistent in large part, even before the situation 
was aggravated by the blows inflicted on borrowers, as interest rates rose and 
the exchange rate depreciated after December 1994. The capitalization of some 
banks was thin or completely transparent. The quality of the human capital of 
banks had eroded considerably because of the years spent under government 
ownership. The liberalization of  the banking  system, which,  among  other 
changes, freed banks from the obligation to finance some sectors, liberated 
interest rates and eliminated reserve requirements.  All these changes combined 
with suddenly copious resources to induce an increase in aggregate demand 
that would widen quickly and excessively the deficit in the current account of 
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We know now that the Asian countries that collapsed also experienced vast 
credit expansions of dubious quality. The similarities between the Mexican and 
Thai crises, and others, include as well an astronomical increase in real estate 
prices. Real estate prices in Mexico City rose  17.6-fold between December 
1987 and December 1994, while the consumer price index over the same time 
span rose 3.6-fold; and an excessive expansion of mortgage credit into housing 
and office building booms artificially supported the asset price bubble. More 
fundamentally, because of their exchange rate systems, both countries attracted 
fatal amounts of  short-term money. The similarities end there, however, be- 
cause the export growth of some of the Asian countries had petered out by the 
time of their crises, while Mexico’s nonoil exports were growing in 1994 at a 
pace of 20 percent, over an already very high base. 
Contrary to some widely held perceptions, information concerning the be- 
havior of the Mexican economy was available to anyone who wanted to see it. 
Data on the balance of  payments, the nature, size, and volatility of  capital 
flows, the size and speed of the expansion of credit, and the growth of the non- 
performing portfolio of the banks were there for anyone to see, with a timeli- 
ness and quality equaled even then by few countries. 
As we realize the nature of Mexico’s and of other recent crises, a fundamen- 
tal question arises: What should economists watch? 
Another issue is the appropriate exchange rate regime. Some may  opt for 
what I believe are the increasingly futile bands, others for flexible exchange 
rates. Experience suggests that the answer may be found at either of  two ex- 
tremes: either no autonomous issuing of  currency at all-with  the currency 
board as an approximation of this solution-or  a flexible exchange rate. How- 
ever, it is important to set out the conditions for a well-functioning flexible 
exchange rate. It is not sufficient to simply let it loose. Among other ingredi- 
ents, coverage mechanisms are essential, but especially in immediate postcrisis 
periods. Institutions that allow for cover may not be sufficient, however. Inves- 
tors have to be assured of the delivery of hard currency at the end of the leg of 
a transaction. The importance of  this ingredient was evident at the outset of 
the Mexican crisis. Despite the existence of a deep market in forward contracts, 
the foreign exchange market did not contribute to the stabilization of the peso 
and of  local interest rates until delivery became guaranteed with the appear- 
ance of futures transactions on the Chicago Merchantile Exchange. 
Having expanded on the pros and cons of alternative exchange rate regimes 
and other implications for the attraction of  particular capital flows, I should 
pay tribute to the obvious. Recent currency stability in Mexico may have been 
aided by  the different elements detailed in this paper, but it would not have 
been possible without the deep adjustment made in the government budget, 
without wage revisions that have not outstripped gains in productivity, or with- 
out political stability. 
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CAT0 conference: “The only way to avoid an accident when your ship is head- 
ing windward onto a reef in the middle of  a storm, is not to get into such a 
situation in the first place.” 
Let me add something to what I said before, and that is about the Fed tight- 
ening in 1994.’ I most certainly agree that the Fed tightening in the early 1980s 
is an important part of the explanation of economic behavior at the time. Rates 
went up dramatically. It had a big impact on the U.S. economy. It had a big 
impact on export prices from Latin America. But did the 1994 change really 
matter that much to Mexico, or did the political shocks of that year trigger the 
crisis, together with the fact that Mexico’s current account was getting so far 
out of line? How important are those, in retrospect, relatively small movements 
of U.S. interest rates in 1994 as a driver of what happened to the peso-dollar 
exchange rate? 
Edwards’s comments on the movements in the yield of the thirty-year bond 
are on target. Such movements are often premonitory of tightening by the Fed, 
as is the expectation of tightening by the Fed. Now that we are floating, these 
effects take about fifteen minutes to take hold-they  are like an electric charge 
to the market. The moment we have the price of a thirty-year Treasury bond fall- 
ing, right away we have our exchange rate depreciating and our interest rates 
rising, and vice versa when the price rises. I don’t know if anyone has found a 
correlation between these hourly movements, but it doesn’t really matter. We 
feel it every day by the hour. 
But in  1994, Edwards is quite right, these effects took somewhat longer. 
Maybe it was because, as Fraga was saying, there was a lot of confidence in 
the economic team. Whatever the reason, it took somewhat longer, and I think 
it was the political events that had the first impact, although sooner or later 
rising interest rates also had an effect on the flows out of Mexico. 
Peter Garber asked about the capitalization, the price paid for the banks and 
how that impinged on their performance. There were three kinds of banks, or 
three groups or tiers of purchasers of banks. One tier immediately started fig- 
uring out how to conduct fraudulent operations with their banks. It isn’t a ques- 
tion of bad loans; it’s a question of black holes in their accounts, money that 
hasn’t been found. You can go up to several billion dollars when you’re looking 
at those operations. So it wasn’t an isolated case of maybe a loan or a sour op- 
eration. Some of these small and medium-sized banks, which were in the hands 
of people who are now being prosecuted or who are abroad facing extradition 
by the Mexican government, lost funds that were simply channeled to their 
owners’ private uses. 
The next tier raised the money needed to bid for the banks by convincing 
many people that they would enjoy large capital gains and telling them that as 
soon as they had control of the bank, investors would obtain loans to pay for 
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the shares they were committing to buy. So in those cases it wasn’t a problem 
of  having paid too much for the banks, but often of having paid too little or 
nothing, because once you consolidated the assets with the liabilities there was 
no capital left in some cases. 
Third is the tier where the two big banks are situated, as well as some others, 
some very small ones actually. In this tier you find that real capital was put in, 
and there were no fraudulent schemes; but even in these cases there was some 
poor lending, although most of this bad lending took place before the banks 
were privatized. 
The reason is that before the liberalization of the financial system came a re- 
duction in government debt. Internal government debt went down from 20 per- 
cent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP over a couple of years. Five percent is still a 
large amount, as Fraga says, because 5 percent of GDP is a lot of money. Never- 
theless, the internal debt of the government fell by 75 percent as the proceeds 
of the privatization of all kinds of firms, as well as some government surpluses, 
went to pay off that debt. That created a huge amount of  leeway for banks to 
lend, and that activity was already happening when the banks were still in the 
government sector. The successful renegotiation of the government’s external 
debt was concluded before the banks were privatized, and this fact alone al- 
lowed the banks to obtain substantial amounts of foreign resources. So credit 
started to increase very quickly at that time, and bad loans were being gener- 
ated even then. 
The other question that Garber raises goes beyond the numbers I presented, 
because I state that the amounts invested by foreigners in money market instru- 
ments have not changed much, but he says that the system can be shorted in 
several other ways, and that maybe such movements are not reflected in those 
statistics. And he is quite right. I don’t think anybody knows. The amounts that 
investors can move  around by  using  derivatives are much  larger than  the 
amounts I mentioned, although presumably there have  not been very wide 
swings, given the stability of the exchange rate over recent years. I did not want 
to downplay this factor but rather to emphasize the useful information that is 
available. Moreover, regardless of information not available, I think you should 
worry if you see a bank whose portfolio is increasing by leaps and bounds, and 
more so when you see a whole system behaving that way. That’s a rule of thumb 
for anybody analyzing a banking system, or an individual bank. And that’s 
what was happening. We provided that information every month, with a three- 
month lag, which is a very short lag for information about a whole banking 
system. 
We  had, of course, current account data. And while, just as Paul Krugman 
suggested, I wouldn’t worry too much about the current account per se, I would 
perhaps about the relationship between the current account deficit as a pro- 
portion to GDP and the growth of  GDP-the  sustainability issue raised by 
Edwards-because  it is not so much the current account, but how much debt 
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growth, then, if  that money has been well invested, you  are not necessarily 
getting into a more precarious situation. But in the case of Mexico, the ratio of 
the current account to GDP was growing much faster than GDP. And also the 
structure of  its financing, because of  many factors that combined to produce 
that structure, was so short term and so volatile that eventually we got into prob- 
lems. 
Now  I would like to say something about international reserves, because 
even though Agustin Carstens and I wrote and published a paper about them, 
I think we haven’t got the point across. The number that was provided for the 
amount of international reserves of the central bank, which was already quite 
low,  was  released in November 1994 at the bankers’ convention, and it was 
widely published and widely known. So we were not hiding anything. Maybe 
nobody wants to acknowledge it today, but we certainly did release that num- 
ber, and it was accurate. Now we publish it every week and nobody follows it 
any more. 
Andrew Crockett raised the question of optimal exchange rate strategy, and 
somebody else mentioned, I think it was Fraga, that the Argentine mechanism 
worked not because it was automatic, but because there was support. I certainly 
agree with that. No  system can withstand a massive and persistent currency 
attack, a speculative attack, or can resist it without any effects on the system. 
I suppose that a currency board and a flexible exchange rate are ways of mak- 
ing things more transparent and more immediate, but there are certainly no 
vaccines against crisis if an attack is strong enough. What would be the optimal 
strategy for South America? I have very little knowledge. 
Finally, related to current account information, I would like to end by com- 
menting that some years ago Milton Friedman said that current account figures 
shouldn’t be published. They should be abolished. So he concurs completely 
with Krugman’s point of  view. 
3. Arminio Fraga 
In my remarks I will take the viewpoint of a practitioner, which is what I have 
been for many years. First, a bit of background. I fully agree with Sebastian 
Edwards’s view that capital flows to Latin America have been hot and cold, or 
up and down as he says. That has certainly been the case for a long time, as a 
wonderful book by Carlos Marichal(l989) clearly demonstrates. 
In most crises reviewed by Marichal swings in the supply of funds played a 
very important if not key role. Work by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) 
on this subject highlights and supports this view. Their research presents ev- 
idence that factors external to a country’s domestic fundamentals frequently 
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policy is loose in the main financial centers, the developing countries tend to 
have easy access to capital. Conversely, countries typically face problems fol- 
lowing a Fed tightening, a financial crisis, a war, and so forth. Recent examples 
include the Fed tightening engineered by Volcker in the early 1980s followed 
by the debt crisis and the more recent Mexican crisis, which came on the heels 
of the relentless tightening of 1994. 
Some vulnerability was present in the first place in all of these cases. This 
vulnerability is often a product of the excesses of  the boom years, again in 
classic fashion, i la Kindleberger (1978). Some of the signs that trouble may 
be brewing include drastic real exchange rate appreciations, as well as compla- 
cency in the financial sector associated with loan growth that outstrips real 
GDP growth several times over. These and other signs are commonly associ- 
ated with periods in which capital comes too easily. 
Naturally each  crisis has  a slightly different flavor.  For example, in  the 
1980s, in Latin America, one could argue that the crisis was driven by foreign 
borrowing, which was financing budget deficits. A lesson was learned: that 
was not a good idea. Then perhaps we could say in the 1990s that capital flows 
were financing consumption. Again, not a very good idea, because it doesn’t 
generate any capacity to repay. And one could argue in the case of Asia more 
recently that overinvesting also ends up exposing the borrower to the risk of 
a crisis. 
One factor, however, seems to be there every single time. This is my own 
undocumented experience, or somewhat documented; I have studied the crises 
of the 1980s and the 1930s. That factor is short-term debt. The danger signal 
for us investors that seems to be clear-maybe  clearest of all, next to banking 
abuses-is  the excessive accumulation of  short-term debt. It usually comes 
toward the end of a credit cycle, again in standard Kindleberger fashion. 
From a conceptual standpoint it is somewhat puzzling why the maturity pro- 
file of a country’s debt is important. In a world where derivatives are available 
maybe it shouldn’t matter that much. But it seems that it does matter. 
One explanation that is consistent with a world where investors can create 
their own interest rate and currency risk profiles (by engaging in transactions 
such as swaps, forwards, futures, or options) is the fact that the production 
function for derivatives requires the use of balance sheets of banks and other 
institutions. And when the stock of short-term debt outstanding is large, finan- 
cial intermediaries have no difficulty producing derivative instruments to sell 
short a given currency: they simply borrow the short-term instruments and sell 
them in the marketplace. 
Take the Mexican case as an example. It was very hard to sell the peso short 
during  the  period  that  preceded  the  crisis  because  the  Mexican  authori- 
ties  strongly discouraged Mexican banks from offering currency forwards. 
However, with the large stock of outstanding peso-denominated treasury bills 
(known by their Spanish acronym CETES) shorting the peso was not impos- 
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peso. To conclude, excessive short-term debt is risky not only because of  the 
standard rollover risk it entails but also because it allows investors to take short 
positions more easily even in the presence of other restrictions. If a large stock 
of  short-term debt had not been there, perhaps Mexico would not have been 
so vulnerable. 
This brings me to an interesting question, and an important one. Somebody 
is borrowing short term, and one can come up with a lot of reasons why. Gov- 
ernments, for example, tend to have short horizons. They typically don’t care 
much beyond their own administrations. But what about investors? Why do 
they finance these financial parties? Why do they stick around for so long? I 
guess one could invoke some sort of disaster myopia, in the style of what used 
to be the explanation for the debt crisis of the 1980s.  Additionally, one can ob- 
serve in the markets what could be characterized as trend-following behavior, 
whereby investors ride their winners. Financial flows tend to follow good per- 
formance. Derivatives also tend to generate this pattern, as we learned from 
the research on the portfolio insurance practices of some years back. 
Another element that deserves to be highlighted in the context of this discus- 
sion is the role of governments and their policies in the process. Governments, 
for whatever reason, usually for political reasons, often try to defend situations 
that are clearly unsustainable. And when governments have a history of success 
and are good at telling their story, investors tend to hear it, at least for some 
time. This further delays the needed adjustment. The recent crisis in Thailand 
is a perfect example. Were it not for the spectacular successes of Thailand in 
the previous decade it would not have been possible to build the imbalances 
that eventually caused the Thai collapse in 1997. 
The market patterns observed in the Mexican and Thai crises are fairly stan- 
dard. The story typically begins with good fundamentals initiating a positive 
trend. There then follows a phase of complacency in which the trend continues 
despite the surfacing of  economic and financial excesses. Moreover, in both 
these countries policies in place at a microeconomic level created incentives 
for a rapid build-up of  foreign and  domestic indebtedness. Finally, reality 
catches up with the markets and the trend is broken, frequently in violent fash- 
ion. Then we start over again. . . 
I would now  like to discuss some cases in Latin America. I’ll start with 
Mexico-very  briefly because I generally agree with the presentation by Fran- 
cisco Gil Diaz. For Mexico, the break came with the devaluation of  1994-95. 
Before the crisis Mexico displayed a growing current account deficit and a de- 
clining rate of saving. This meant that inflows of external capital were in effect 
financing consumption. These inflows, in turn, were increasingly characterized 
by short maturities, a clear vulnerability as discussed above. As if that was not 
enough, Mexico was then hit by two exogenous shocks: the Fed tightening and 
the political events and assassinations of  1994. These were some of the key 
causal ingredients of the crisis. 
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the first trend, the one that went all the way  to the cliff. There were a lot of 
reasons for the longevity of this trend, starting with the high quality of govern- 
ment officials in Mexico, who really did a great job up until the very end. Until 
1993 the Mexican story made a lot of  sense, despite the growing current ac- 
count deficit. Additionally, as mentioned above, it was difficult to sell the peso 
short. The government of Mexico was always informally on top of the situa- 
tion, trying not to allow a market for peso derivatives to develop. That may 
have been a case where partial liberalization worked against Mexico, because 
while it was easy to bring short-term capital into Mexico, it was hard to hedge 
it. Perhaps the absence of foreign banks in Mexico also led to what Gil Diaz 
described as a poorly managed banking system, after the privatization, when 
the banks were basically bought by brokers. 
Mexico’s response to the crisis and the support package it received are well 
known. The recovery came swiftly and brought with it a renewed sense of 
stability, as discussed by  Gil Diaz. This stability is in large part due to the 
prudent management of fiscal and monetary policies, which in turn lead to the 
absence of short-term debt. One consequence of this successful adjustment has 
been a continuous appreciation of the peso in red terms. One potential risk to 
be monitored in this context is that if the currency appreciates all the way back 
to where it was before the crisis, we may see the same movie again. This is a 
very difficult policy issue that many governments face in a world where capital 
flows are prone to bouts of enthusiasm and depression. What can be done about 
this problem? 
We have talked about capital controls and how they can perhaps be used on 
a temporary basis. But then what else can be done? Fiscal policy is just not an 
alternative. Governments don’t have fiscal policy as a button they can push. It 
takes time; it’s hard to do. The right policy response to what is known as the 
capital inflow problem is still a subject of debate. 
Brazil is now  in its third year of  not having inflation. Brazil had been a 
monetary alcoholic for most of its history. I as a Brazilian grew up in that en- 
vironment. It really feels strange to have 5 percent inflation down there, and I 
think it is quite an achievement. But the achievement came with a few imbal- 
ances that naturally pose some risk of future problems. 
After stabilizing and implementing an impressive array of structural reforms 
(trade liberalization, privatization, banking reform, etc.), Brazil finds itself in 
a situation where inflation is low but it has to deal with twin fiscal and current 
account deficits. The nominal budget deficit, though declining from the heights 
of the high-inflation era, remained at 6 percent of GDP in 1997 (4 percent in 
the operational concept, i.e., in real terms), while the current account deficit 
has reached about 4.3 percent of GDP. Brazil has chosen a gradual approach 
to handling these problems that, although not free of risks, seems feasible. The 
budget deficit is being gradually reduced, to the tune of  1 percent of GDP a 
year. Further progress depends on proposed civil service and social security 
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rent account deficit the exchange rate is being depreciated at a rate that will 
generate a real devaluation of about 5 percent a year. 
The gradualist approach on the fiscal and balance-of-payments fronts is 
likely to succeed because it is being compensated by aggressive monetary and 
privatization policies. The policy of very high interest rates is possible because 
banking sector problems were tackled early. Also, at this point there is very 
little leverage in the Brazilian economy. For instance, loans to the private sector 
add up to less than 25 percent of GDP, compared to 150 percent of GDP or so 
in Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea. Brazil can therefore can afford to run a very 
tight monetary policy for some time, at the cost of postponing a long overdue 
resumption of fast and sustained economic growth. 
In terms of capital flows, Brazil has moved away from short-term financing. 
During the first year after the Real plan, Brazil was flooded with hot money. 
Since then the share of  short-term financing of the current account has been 
shrinking. Already in  1996, some 50 percent of  the deficit was financed by 
foreign direct investment and equity portfolio flows. Equities are inherently 
more stable because they have an automatic stabilizing factor. If  investors de- 
cide to leave, prices go down, and investors change their minds. That is not the 
case with short-term money, which allows for exit at close to par under all but 
the most extreme circumstances. 
On the issue of  capital controls, I tend to agree with Sebastian Edwards. 
Capital controls may  play a useful role in the short term, particularly when 
employed to support and reinforce good economic policies. In the long term, 
however, they are distortive and ineffective. Here I draw on my brief but illumi- 
nating experience at the central bank of Brazil. We  spent one and a half years 
there trying to reduce or rationalize an extensive set of  capital controls. I left 
the central bank convinced that long-term capital controls had harmed Brazil 
more than they had helped. They gave policymakers a false sense of security 
and probably allowed Brazil to avoid or postpone a number of important mac- 
roeconomic policy changes and structural reforms. 
References 
Calvo, Guillermo A., Leonard0 Leiderman, and Carmen M. Reinhart.  1993. Capital 
inflows and real exchange rate appreciation in Latin America. IMF Staff Papers 40 
(Mach): 108-51. 
Kindleberger, Charles. 1978. Manias, panics and crashes. New York Basic. 
Marichal, Carlos.  1989. A  century  of  debt crises  in Latin America.  Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 53  Capital Flows to Latin America 
Discussion Summary 
Sebastian Edwards noted that capital controls may become a central topic of 
discussion at the upcoming Summit of  the Americas because few disagree- 
ments remain on trade issues. He cited evidence that although capital controls 
have become permanent fixtures in many countries, including Chile, Colom- 
bia, and Brazil, they are largely ineffective. Edwards also drew attention to the 
centrality of sustainability in considering the current account deficits that are 
common in Latin America. For example, Chile’s 4 percent current account 
deficit may be manageable given the size of incoming foreign direct investment 
flows and their productive potential. 
David Folkerts-Landau  noted that dismissing capital controls is equivalent 
to depriving countries of an instrument with which they can manage their ex- 
ternal position. Moeen Qureshi also noted the irony that when capital flows 
were minimal in the 1950s and 1960s, the IMF recommended capital controls 
to countries. Now capital flows are orders of magnitude larger and the IMF is 
recommending the dismantling of capital controls. 
Peter Garber suggested that this contradiction is resolved by  noting that 
historically most countries had capital controls and so the policy recommenda- 
tions of the IMF reflected this common practice. He inquired about the financ- 
ing methods used in the privatization of banks in Mexico and about the role 
these methods may have played in the crisis. Garber also questioned the em- 
phasis on short-term debt given the ability of  derivatives to transform risks 
across the maturity spectrum. More generally, he emphasized the liquidity of 
the markets rather than the duration of the existing obligations. 
Francisco Gil Diaz replied that there were three types of bank purchases. 
First, some banks were purchased by  individuals who perpetrated fraud. In 
these banks, bad loans per se were not an issue because these banks simply 
became black holes. Second, some purchases were structured to minimize cap- 
ital infusions leaving them highly  vulnerable to losses. Third, for the two 
largest banks and other smaller ones, the purchases involved real capital infu- 
sion and did not involve fraud. In these cases, very poor lending decisions 
made them vulnerable to failure. 
Folkerts-Landau noted that both Gil Diaz and Fraga minimized the role of 
information dissemination while the IMF had emphasized this issue in the 
months following the crisis. He concurred with the speakers that aggregate 
data were available but questioned whether detailed data allowing investors 
to understand the financial exposure of  the system were available in a timely 
fashion in the cases of Mexico and Thailand. Martin Feldstein also questioned 
Fraga about the information advantages that might lead certain speculators to 
behave more aggressively in foreign exchange markets. 
GiZ  Diaz suggested that the relevant information on the banking system and 
reserve position in Mexico was available but went unheeded. While Arminio 
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disclosure, he concurred with Gil Diaz that the Mexican situation was one 
where enough information was  available either through public disclosure or 
through informal channels. 
Paul Krugman noted that the emphasis on certain statistics, such as current 
account deficits, leads to inappropriate conclusions without consideration of 
the investment opportunities within a country. He recalled a quote from James 
Callahan, a former chancellor of the exchequer for the United Kingdom, who 
suggested that the absence of statistics had allowed the British to emerge from 
previous crises unscathed. Feldstein countered that presumably a country runs 
out of reserves at some point. Krugmun replied that, nonetheless, the emphasis 
on statistics may obscure underlying subtleties to an economic situation. 
David Mullins noted that all central bankers would appreciate this call for 
opaqueness. Qureshi supported Krugman’s point that certain types of informa- 
tion are being emphasized at the expense of  a subtler understanding of the 
larger economic situation. He referred to the recent emphasis on the strength 
of the financial sector, for example, and questioned how fundamental this is to 
a country’s prospects. Gil Diuz recalled that Milton Friedman had suggested 
that current account figures not be published. Krugman responded to this com- 
parison by retracting his initial suggestion. 
Andrew Crockett suggested that currency boards or flexible exchange rates 
provide for more stability than fixed exchange rates. He emphasized, however, 
that linkages created by  common trade areas, such as Mercosur, could create 
spillovers when exchange rate regimes are distinct. Thus, the question of  the 
optimal strategy within trade zones that feature distinct exchange rate regimes 
is extremely important. Feldsrein noted that these problems are common to all 
countries pursuing stable relations with their trading partners. Gil Diuz agreed 
that flexible exchange rates, while superior to fixed regimes, are no vaccine 
against crisis and that no system can resist a speculative attack given the link- 
ages in the world economy through trade and capital flows. 
In contrast to Fraga’s conclusions about Brazil, Edwards expressed concern 
about its short-term debt position. He suggested that massive increases in re- 
serves would be needed over the next several years for Brazil to emerge un- 
scathed. Mullins noted that if privatization proceeds are required for Brazil to 
emerge from its current predicament, its prospects are tightly linked to the 
future of the U.S. equity market. Finally, Garber noted that in the Brazilian 
case, some foreign direct investment was used to disguise short-term inflows 
as firms circumvented capital controls by buying small firms and purchasing 
commercial paper. 
Frugu agreed that there exists little room for error in Brazil’s situation. How- 
ever, he suggested that the gradual process of annual 5 percent real devaluation 
now  under way  could prove successful. He also noted that much of  the re- 
maining short-term debt is domestic and that much of the short-term foreign 
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Brazil’s prospects for emerging from its current difficulties without a severe 
discontinuity. 
Edwards suggested that political events were more central to the Mexican 
crisis than were Federal Reserve actions. Fed tightening began in February 
1994, suggesting large and unreasonable lags for it to have played a large role 
in the crisis. Similarly, Mullins noted, the recent Asian crisis featured a very 
benign backdrop of low interest rates and a booming stock market. In a similar 
vein, Feldstein noted that while steep increases in U.S. interest rates in the 
early 1980s may have had an important effect around the world, he disagreed 
that the gradual tightening of  1994 could have had such a dramatic effect. ln- 
stead, he highlighted the political events and the current account situation for 
the Mexican crisis. 
Gil Diaz suggested that large changes in the long end of the term structure 
in the United States were premonitory of tightening and that these effects were 
felt immediately in Mexico. More generally, he agreed that political factors 
were most important and interest rate changes were secondary. This Page Intentionally Left Blank